To say that this advice is preposterous and quasi-comical is a vast understatement.

Unpredictability – It has been universally stated that the behavior of wildland fire is unpredictable. The importance of unpredictability is that all possibilities must be considered in the planning process. By reading Stonegate's Fire Protection Plan (see Chapters 4 and 7), we recognize that planning for a wildland fire in a development built in the midst of a wildland setting will rely on the developer’s prediction of the way the fire will behave, with little consideration given to the fact that wildfire is anything but predictable. Fire consultants to the Stonegate developers have gone on record as stating that any wildfire occurring on Merriam Mountain would “be small” and “elliptical” in shape. Anyone who is in the least bit knowledgeable about wildfire behavior will recognize these assertions to be preposterous.

Examples of SIP (as opposed to the unknown ISIP)

We can learn something from research on what occurs when people choose to stay in their homes during a wildland fire (an example of SIP but not an example of ISIP). We will reiterate that this form of SIP is voluntary and thus many variables are controlled with respect to specialized situations and very defined parameters.

First, we examined cases where people have planned to and actually stayed in their homes during a wildland fire in individual cases in the outback region of Australia. In this part of the world there exists a strategy called “Stay Or Go Early” (SOGE)[1].  The concept is that able-bodied and motivated people can help defend their homes while at the same time use their homes to help defend them. This strategy is typically used only by people living in the bush country where individual homes are dozens if not hundreds of miles apart and where governmental firefighting resources are unavailable. The precondition to SOGE is that all those who may not be able to tolerate the smoke, heat, and fright are first relocated (the first important difference from ISIP). This is supported by the conclusion that “Most of the people who died in their homes or within a short distance thereof were either very old and infirm or suffered from some physical disability.”[2] Another condition is that the person(s) who stays becomes actively engaged in fighting the fire (the second important difference).  This has met with some success but is not a guaranteed strategy. It involves a strong resolve and commitment as demonstrated by some historical accounts of the perils and trauma of what may be entailed.[3]

It is also a personal decision to be made with great forethought and responsibility. The concept of ISIP proposed for communities such as Rancho Santa Fe does not intend that residents become engaged in firefighting and makes no allowance for those who may not be able to survive in a compromised wildfire environment. Most important, it leaves no choice as to whether to stay or go.

The proponents of SIP (who actually mean ISIP) have always pointed to “firewise” construction of houses and the fuel modification zones around the homes in order to protect the structures. They have assumed that every structure will survive[4] and there will be a 100% correlation with the survival of the human beings who reside in that structure. The obvious question becomes what if a house catches fire. What if one of the 2,700 residences in Stonegate has an open window or a firebrand lands on flammable material near a home? In an analysis of the homes that burned down in the 2007 fires, it was ascertained that even homes with firewise construction were susceptible to being destroyed by fire and that firebrands (flying embers) were the major culprit.[5] The fuel modification zones (distance where fuel has been reduced) were not a variable in many homes that were burned. In addition, large, dense developments suggest attached and semi-attached multistory housing and close-proximity housing as in Stonegate. This adds the problem of creating an urban type fire in a wildland fire setting that adds a new parameter to effective firefighting and shatters the concept of fuel modification zones and defensible space. If even one house catches on fire (and no ISIP proponent will state that the stick houses they build will be fire-proof), then there will be a spread of fire from one home to another with people remaining in the homes. The homes will actually be a source of fuel rather than a protective entity and the complexity of saving people’s lives and fighting fire on an unfavorable terrain with limited resources will be overwhelming.

If developers were to depend on ISIP to create large dense developments and the worst-case fire scenarios precluded evacuation, then the host of variables (unpredictability, time for people to react, logistics, decision-making, human behavior in a catastrophic event, and human variability in tolerating a catastrophe) would all become important and influence potential injury and death. It has been proven that in the face of an act of God or man (wildland fire) that evacuation is an effective means of preventing loss of life. If a wildland fire occurred and evacuation were not possible, then the loss of life should be squarely blamed on the inability to evacuate. If people die in an ISIP community, then their deaths are due to a terrible decision that they could be protected without evacuating. The County Supervisors and CalFire would have made that terrible decision in allowing a dangerous development to be built at all. The Governor of the State of California (to whom CalFire reports) should share the responsibility by ignoring the warnings of many that a firetrap is being approved.

What is equally compelling is that approving the building of such a development would be against state law and even the developer admits this. On page 131 of Stonegate’s Specific Plan (Jan 2006), the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) state law is quoted:

“POLICIES ON NEW DEVELOPMENT

1.                  Prohibits construction of homes and essential facilities in hazardous areas unless they can be designed to reduce the hazard to the satisfaction of responsible agencies.”

In later chapters of this book, it will be revealed that a responsible agency (in the case of Stonegate, the local Fire District having authority) has indeed found that the fire hazard is very severe and that the mitigation is inadequate.

In order to evaluate what would occur if an ISIP community such as the proposed Stonegate development were built, we would do well to consider several different scenarios. Remember, the Stonegate development had predicated its fire strategy on its ability to be an ISIP community. It has readily admitted that the development could not be evacuated.[6]

Scenarios for the Stonegate development:

Scenario 1:

Santa Ana winds start blowing at 70+ mph after a prolonged drought with single digit humidity on a hot day. An arsonist for whatever reason lights a fire, or a motorbike misfires, or children are playing with matches at the base of the Merriam Mountains in the area of chaparral that has not burned. A fire starts and burns rapidly and intensely up the mountain associated with dense smoke, heat, embers, noise and flames creating a frightful picture. There are 10,000-13,000 people in their homes, in the parks, in the woods or on the roads.

            Of course, there would be no time for evacuation of so many people. The roads through the natural habitat would not be passable. The major egress roads would become immediately clogged with poor visibility and, as in late evacuation, accidents would occur. There would be panic in trying to find and protect loved ones. Windows would not all be closed and some homes would catch fire from embers. The sparse amount of fire personnel would be helpless in fighting an urban fire in the midst of a wildland fire intermingled with thousands of residents needing help. Everyone would be at the mercy of the fire. There would not be enough time (less than 15 minutes) for any effective coordination by the government, law enforcement, fire personnel or the population to deal with the event.

 The only statement that could be made in such a scenario is that Stonegate should never have been built because of this specific potential danger and the resultant injury and loss of life that would occur.

Scenario 2:

A fire starts 20-30 miles east of Stonegate without a lot of wind but with a forecast for Santa Anas to start blowing. People from Stonegate are alerted and all those with physical disabilities, the very young and the very old are told to leave and they do so in an orderly fashion. The remainder have time to prepare their homes (close windows, remove drapes, put furniture in the center of the rooms) and collect their belongings. The fire personnel in the county are prepared to prevent the fire from moving west (if the winds are favorable) by using fire breaks, air support and other means. An orderly evacuation is begun. It is important to note that the real advantage of firewise construction and planning is being realized. There will be an expected reduction in the number of homes that may be affected by the wildfire but there is no guarantee how many of the homes will survive. There will be no need for shelter-in-place. Firefighters will not have to worry about protecting people since the residents will be able to evacuate.

Scenario 3:

A fire starts 5 miles east of Stonegate with high velocity Santa Ana winds. The physically disabled, the very young and the very old are told to leave but they will require that others leave with them (e.g., a mother would not be separated from her child). They will want to take personal items with them and there would be a delay. Other residents in the vicinity plus animal evacuation nearby would also be competing for the roads. Smoke would hamper efforts and all roads would not be passable. Suddenly the fire is upon them and they are caught in the fire on the highly congested roads because of the sheer volume of people and animals that are present for such limited infrastructure to escape. The results would be the same as late evacuation (certain injury and death for many). Shelter-in-place would not be able to be effectively applied because of the need to evacuate certain vulnerable groups and the inability to predict the speed and progress of the fire.

Scenario 4:

A fire starts 2 miles east of Stonegate during a Santa Ana condition. There cannot be enough time for Stonegate to evacuate all the people in the development. The roads are full with people leaving and going. The elderly, the very young, the disabled and medically compromised know they may not be able to tolerate the sheer fright, smoky conditions and heat of the fire if they go back to their homes. They wish to evacuate as the safest option. There is a mass exodus to try to use the available roads. The decision to not allow people to leave would be unconscionable and would not be made.  Some people go to their homes and follow instructions but their neighbor’s home (only 20 feet away) are left exposed and vulnerable with windows open or drapes exposed. Some have left for the day and there is no one to open the drapes or move furniture. One of these homes catches fire and the fire quickly spreads to an adjacent home. The heat is intense and people then follow instructions to go out of their homes into the flames with exposure to radiant heat and smoke. There is no experience with this scenario. It would be catastrophic in terms of lives lost.

Arguments Promoting Shelter-In-Place

San Diego County politicians, CalFire, developers and others with vested interests wish to promote SIP (actually ISIP) because THEY NEED THIS STRATEGY TO BUILD IN THE WILDLAND URBAN INTERFACE. Evacuation is not possible from the Stonegate/Merriam Mountains development because of the terrain, population density, and poor access. Residents would have no way to cope with the unpredictability and speed of a wind-driven wildland fire. There are many in CalFire who will not speak out against dangerous planning and development because they fear loss of their jobs if they fail to bend to the will of their superiors. We have spoken to at least one San Diego County Fire Chief who stated that when he tried to object to unsafe development, he “had his wings clipped.” Below are some of the questionable arguments given by fire personnel and others as to why SIP (and they mean ISIP) is a reasonable fire strategy.

The Barona Casino

During the 2003 San Diego fires, people became trapped in the Barona Casino. Trying to leave the casino in a car would expose people to a “late evacuation” through a danger zone of an unpredictable wildland fire. The casino was a large structure and was ringed by firefighters. It was successfully defended and cited as an example of SIP. It is a poor and specious comparison to what would occur at Stonegate in the scenarios mentioned. The Stonegate development is located atop Merriam Mountain, surrounded by thousands of acres of dense and highly flammable mountain terrain. There would be no safe building, no ring of firefighters large enough and no coordinated effort possible to save the thousands of people and thousands of individual homes. At Stonegate, everyone would be inside their stick-built (i.e. wood-frame) houses and left on their own.

Stevenson Ranch

Stevenson Ranch is a 3,500-home community on the edge of the Santa Susana Mountains in the Santa Clarita valley north of Los Angeles. It was built using “firewise” construction and was threatened during the 2003 fires. When the 2003 Simi fires started hundreds of miles to the east of the development and began spreading in the general direction of the Santa Clarita valley, the residents of Stevenson Ranch had several days’ notice to prepare for the oncoming fire. There was ample time for an orderly, mandatory total evacuation of the entire development (which was accomplished) and ample time for firefighting equipment to be mobilized to defend the structures of the community which was situated in the valley and not upon a fuel-laden mountain terrain. The total evacuation of Stevenson Ranch is certainly not an example of ISIP.

The Rancho Santa Fe communities of Cielo, 4S Ranch, The Bridges, The Crosby and Santa Fe Valley

These five communities were designated as SIP communities and all survived the Witch Creek Fire in 2007. They were all evacuated.  Several residents chose not to evacuate and did well in their homes. There is no question that it is better to construct homes in a firewise manner and to create fuel modification zones and defensible space to try to contain a wildland fire. Pointing to anecdotal accounts of success that the protection of a home or homes in special circumstances does not allow for a quantum leap to suggest all people will be safe if they do not evacuate in all types of fires. The fact that some people chose to stay in their Rancho Santa Fe community homes in 2007 already suggests that the particular threat to these people was less than severe and that the wildfire happened to bypass them rather than travel over them directly. The variables associated with wildfire and the unpredictable course that a wildfire takes is the reason that people must evacuate. To say that the first choice is always to evacuate is obvious and is not related. The real question comes up when we consider the failures of firewise construction, fuel modification zones and defensible space.

An article written for the Associated Press and carried in the NC Times[7] stated that many of the homes that did burn in the 2007 fires were caused by flying embers (and this included homes that were built of fire- resistant walls and roofs). The article stated: “The analysis of the Witch fire’s pattern of destruction points to deficiencies in long-held beliefs that brush clearing and fire-resistant materials are enough to fend off wildfires.”  It also stated that “well over 75% of the destroyed homes had fire-resistant exteriors.” Since embers can travel for miles, the concept of fuel modification zones used to protect homes was not enough to prevent the homes from burning. It also suggested that homes were vulnerable to embers (embers driven by winds through small openings or against exposed wood) could burn – if occupants were present, then they could perish. This brings us back to the Australian experience where those who stay must be prepared to fight the fire (and put out embers). This cannot include infants, the elderly, the physically compromised and the disabled. Very few would able to act as competent firefighters and to base the safety of a development on such an assumption would be preposterous.

In an 2003 article by a landscape architect who interviewed many of those people whose houses burned to the ground in the 2003 San Diego County fires, these homeowners confirmed that they had followed the latest firewise building and landscaping codes, including recommended distance from vegetative fuel, but that all these precautions failed to save their homes.[8] The article gave numerous examples of homes with large clearances (fuel modification zones) that burned to the ground. If any of these structures would have been occupied, it can be assumed that the residents would have died or would have been severely injured. The question will then naturally be how many deaths can be tolerated to allow developers to build in the wildland urban interface and use ISIP as a primary strategy of fire protection.

Smoke and Shelter-in-Place

Smoke from wildfire consists of a combination of noxious gases and particulate matter.

Injury can occur from inhalation of the gases by several mechanisms. If the gases are hot enough (as would occur with close proximity to the smoke generation), then direct thermal burns will result. If the fire reduces the oxygen, then the replacement gases (e.g. carbon dioxide) will not support metabolism and asphyxiation will take place. If carbon monoxide is inhaled, then the oxygen-carrying ability of the blood will be reduced. Gases such as hydrogen cyanide can actually interfere directly with the body’s ability to use oxygen and thus acts as a poison. Other gases (such as sulfur dioxide, ammonia and aldehydes) can be irritants to respiratory structures and cause bronchospasm (closing of the airway) or edema (swelling and fluid accumulation), all leading to inability to breathe. The particulate matter (soot and dust) can settle in various parts of the respiratory system depending on their size and lead to obstruction, swelling and/or irritation. These can have immediate or long-term effects.

The nature and extent of the injury will naturally depend on the concentration of the smoke, the duration of exposure and the susceptibility of the individual to respiratory challenges. Actual experience with smoke in shelter-in-place scenarios has not been studied (especially as to how it may affect a diverse population group in close proximity to the fire). The fire personnel have been interested only in how a non-biological structure may survive the fire and have paid little or no attention to the human parameters. Since evacuation has always taken place, there is little information except experience gained from analyzing those caught in house fires.

Articles regarding the effect of smoke show that 60-80% of all deaths[9] of burn victims occur from smoke inhalation. Wildland fire will result in smoke but large concentrations of heavy smoke will occur where the fire is actively burning. “Clinical manifestations vary among victims, depending on their susceptibility to injury and degree of exposure.”  A recent article from Athens, Georgia described how a young child died from only a brief exposure to smoke in a small house fire without any signs of burns on his body. The point to be made is that in any shelter-in-place strategy, the concentration and duration of the smoke exposure must be considered along with the population group that is exposed to the smoke and its susceptibility to smoke inhalation.  When responding to a question concerned about the potential harmful effects of smoke to residents who are forced to shelter-in-place, Deer Springs Fire Chief Ned Nickerson went so far as to deny that smoke will be a problem. He stated:

"From basic chemistry, we know that hot air rises. I guess smoke does too.” 

This response comes from a CalFire employee attempting to defend a developer’s Fire Protection Plan. This type of irrational response is of no use in evaluating a potentially dangerous proposal. The amount of smoke that gets into a house is significant when the testimonials of the Australian experience with shelter-in-place are examined.[10] To reiterate, in the Australia outback, the infants, the asthmatics, the elderly and others are relocated well before the approach of a wildfire. In proposed developments in San Diego County, however, the particularly vulnerable population groups will remain stuck in their homes in shelter-in-place communities. If these groups are caught anywhere where the smoke concentration is high or where the person exposed cannot even tolerate any compromised air quality, then death or injury will result. To highlight this problem, the American Lung Association (ALA), an authoritative source in the field, can be cited. The ALA has already published a brochure entitled Wildfire Smoke. This brochure was intended as a guide for Public Health officials to communicate the health risks of smoke to the public. When this brochure was published, it was addressing the effects of ambient smoke that may affect people in the proximity of a wildfire. Evacuation was assumed for all those at the point of the fire where the concentrations of the smoke were highest. People living in a residential development are from many different risk groups. The ALA states that the following groups would be particularly vulnerable to injury or death from smoke inhalation (depending of the seriousness of the disease, the concentration of smoke and the duration of exposure):

·        Individuals with airway hyper-responsiveness (asthmatics and some without asthma)

·        Individuals with cardiovascular (heart) disease

·        The elderly

·        Children under the age of five, and especially infants

·        Pregnant women

·        Individuals with any respiratory compromise (e.g., emphysema)

On August 11, 2006, the American Lung Association sent a letter to the San Diego Planning and Land Use Department (DPLU) regarding the danger of having people remain in a shelter-in-place environment in the Stonegate project. [11]  The ALA letter states that people with lung disease would be in jeopardy of loss of life when subjected to the possibility of being trapped within the environment of a wildfire. The entire letter is contained in Appendix 1.

The potential for loss of human life in wildfires

In the recent fires in San Diego County, it has been remarkable how few lives have been lost. Massive and timely evacuations have shown that this is truly the gold standard of protecting life. In the 2007 fires, there were 9 deaths and in the 2003 fires there were 17 deaths.

One might be curious as to what occurred in the past before communication allowed timely evacuation to occur. Certainly the dynamics of injury and death have not changed. If SIP proves to be unsuccessful in protecting large population groups (10,000+ in the Stonegate development), then can history suggest whether there will be many deaths? In 1871 in Peshtigo, Wisconsin, there were over 2,000 people killed and many crippled or mentally traumatized for life when exposed to a wildland fire. This is a good example of what may occur without evacuation.

Physics of Fire and Evacuation

Fire is the physical manifestation of a chemical reaction that results in the release of energy (seen as visible light and felt as heat). The energy released is mainly in the form of radiation (similar in some ways to x-rays or microwaves). This radiation can travel through air or even a vacuum for great distances at the speed of light. Only when the radiation hits an object will it be absorbed (resulting in the heating of that object), reflected, or it will pass through (with non-dense objects such as air). The human body will absorb almost all the radiant heat energy that it encounters. In order for the human skin to burn, there does not have to be any flames nearby. An example is the sun causing sunburns where the fire is located 93 million miles away.

The amount of radiant energy absorbed (which will be a function of time exposed, the amount of emitted radiation per time that reaches an object, and the ability of the object to absorb the radiation) will determine whether the skin will burn. Therefore, being out in the open and being exposed to the radiant energy of a wildland fire is much worse that having an object that will reflect or absorb the radiant energy that is interposed between the person and the point of the chemical reaction (usually seen as flames). Unfortunately if a person stays within a house, radiant energy can come through a window and ignite a drape and start a fire within the house - or it can be reflected within the house until it strikes a person at which time the energy will be absorbed, thus burning the skin. It is interesting that Stonegate defies the logic of protection from fire when encouraging people to go outdoors in the midst of a wildland fire (e.g., an open park). If the fire can be seen from the outdoors or a park (a direct line of sight), then the radiant energy emitted from the fire will strike the person, be absorbed by the skin and will eventually burn the skin.

Fire can travel very rapidly because the radiant energy emitted can go at the speed of light to heat up a nearby object – the object can then ignite before any flames reach the object. The fire can jump quickly in this manner. Wind-blown embers can cause spot fires ahead of an advancing fire, also causing the fire to jump.

All this is important because fire can affect you and burn you without any flames ever touching you. Firefighters using defensible space are dressed appropriately to reflect the radiant heat and still have only very limited time to fight an approaching fire. People exposed to wildland fire will absorb the radiant heat energy and burn much more quickly then a structure. You must protect yourself by shielding yourself from the rays. Staying in a house can be beneficial. Unfortunately, if the house catches fire, you are dead. If the concentration of smoke is high enough, you are also dead. The best and only proven was for people to avoid injury or death during a wildland fire is to evacuate in time.

General Notes on Evacuation

Escaping from a structural fire will require a person to only reach the street outside the structure to be safe. Escaping from a wildland fire will require a person to reach a point outside the path of the wildland fire to be safe. The time necessary to accomplish this feat will be the overriding variable since any persons caught within the fire will significantly expose themselves to injury or death. The variables associated with evacuating in time in a wildland fire would be the number of people to be evacuated (density), and the ability to move those people (roads, logistics, and impediments) to a safe spot. To say that an additional road would solve a problem of wildland fire evacuation is a vast over simplification. Since everyone living in a particular area would be evacuating at the same time, all the roads will be congested and some major roads will be closed because of poor visibility from smoke. The direction of the wildland fire would have to be predicted. When building a new development and asking the question whether it would pose a significant risk of injury or death in a wildland fire, the question of evacuation of that project and its effect on the existing communities’ ability to evacuate must be answered. If a resident of a housing project can get to an arterial outside the project only to find gridlock, then this in no way guarantees safety. If the resident of the project cannot even get to the arterial in a timely fashion because of the speed of the fire, then evacuation is a dead issue. San Diego County has completely ignored any calculations regarding the ability to evacuate in different types of emergencies (such as wildland fire). Thus, they have not predicated their land use decisions on the ability to evacuate. Anyone living in the wildland urban interface in North San Diego County is in danger from wildland fire because the government—namely, the County Supervisors--have decided to ignore the potential for evacuation when voting on future development in this region.

NOTE: San Diego County has incorporated the term “Shelter-in-Place” in county policy without a precise definition. On March 19, 2007, the Board of Supervisors quietly passed a policy called “Guidelines for Determining Significance and Report Format and Content Requirements—Wildland Fire and Fire Protection” in which they gave credence to the concept of Shelter-In-Place.” The policy states: “In the event secondary access for a new proposed community or institution (e.g., school) is unattainable due to topographical or geographical constraints, a Shelter-In-Place design strategy may be considered for the proposed project.” This is unprecedented anywhere in the United States and will be discussed in detail later in the book.