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LIAR! LIAR! County's on FIRE! |
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Early Release Chapter 7 To summarize thus far, the Stonegate
developers were pushing for approval to build a massive housing development in a dangerous, high-fire-hazard severity zone
called Merriam Mountain. The developers admitted that in a worst-case wildland fire scenario, the project could not be evacuated.
They submitted a Fire Protection Plan (FPP) draft based on a fire "strategy" called Shelter-In-Place (SIP)---that
is, residents advised to remain at home in the event of a wildfire. Due to widespread adverse publicity, the County Supervisors
directed the County and Deer Springs fire personnel to state that Stonegate’s FPP could not use the strategy of SIP.
We are now waiting to see how Stonegate’s FPP will deal with the conundrum Stonegate residents should not stay (“shelter-in-place”)
but also cannot leave (because timely evacuation is not possible). . STONEGATE’S FINAL FIRE PROTECTION
PLAN THE FIRE PROTECTION PLAN APPROVED BY THE COUNTY IN THE DARK OF NIGHT --- A MICROCOSM
OF THE ENTIRE STONEGATE PROJECT One
of the most dismal and shocking acts of the County was to clandestinely approve Stonegate’s deficient final Fire Protection
Plan over a holiday week, while County offices were closed, without even showing it to the local Fire District where the development
was to be built. In a masterpiece of timing, the Stonegate developers submitted their final Fire Protection Plan to the County on
December 22, 2006, on the eve of the Christmas holidays. The County was closed for the Christmas holidays the following day.
Sometime during the holiday week (while Planning Unit offices were closed), DPLU County Fire Personnel approved the
final Fire Protection Plan, thereby avoiding any input or comment from the public or the Deer Springs Fire District. Upon
the reopening of County offices on January 3, 2007, the County released an FPP approval letter dated January 2, 2007. The
bypassing of the local Fire District was even more remarkable given that the County does not provide fire protection to the
Deer Springs community. The Deer Springs Fire District (DSFPD) is the Fire Authority Having Jurisdiction
(FAHJ) and is supported by a special fire protection tax surcharge paid by district residents. The DSFPD is wholly independent
from the County and hires its firefighting personnel from CalFire, a state agency that is unrelated to the County. The
FAHJ (Fire Authority having jurisdiction) is defined as “the designated entity providing enforcement of fire regulations
as they relate to planning, construction, and development. This entity may also provide fire suppression and other emergency
services.”[1] The Deer Springs Fire Protection District is empowered by the State to provide:[2] Fire protection services
Rescue services Emergency
medical services Any other services relating
to the protection of lives and property Thus,
the Deer Springs Fire District Board is the FAHJ as defined by the County and empowered by the State. The
County had made numerous references to the Deer Springs Fire District’ authority to rule on Stonegate’s Fire Protection
Plan but decided to ignore these facts for fear that the Fire District (now free from developer control as a result of the
2006 board elections) would reject Stonegate’s FPP and thus provide an obstacle to Stonegate getting a free pass in
the FPP approval process. The CDF (CalFire) remained silent on the inadequacy of Stonegate’s Fire Protection Plan and
did not comment on the County’s approval of the FPP. The County had previously
stated that in order for the project to move forward, it would need the approval of Stonegate’s FPP by the Fire District.
The County commented all along (including the August 31, 2006 letter) that Fire District approval was necessary in gaining
final approval of the FPP. Remember that Bill Horn had to get the project to the level of the Supervisors and therefore had
to have an approved Fire Protection Plan to move forward. The order was passed on to County Fire Personnel to approve the
FPP and bypass the Fire District. The arrogance, injustice and lack of safety-consciousness were blatantly
apparent. The silence of the remaining Supervisors spoke volumes when it comes to protecting the lives and welfare of County
residents. When we examine the details of Stonegate’s approved Fire Protection
Plan, we will see how the developer did not mitigate the great risk to residents living in the Stonegate development and how
CalFire did not take any interest in the safety of a development they will have the responsibility to protect. . Stonegate’s
entire Fire Protection Plan can be found in the Appendix. The developer starts the Fire Protection Plan by
stating that its intent is to satisfy Article 86A of the California code (which in the County’s words) should mean that
the FPP must “evaluate the adverse environmental effects that a proposed project may have from wildland fire and properly mitigate
those impacts to ensure that the development projects do not expose people to a significant risk of injury, or death involving
wildland fires.” The developers were required to explain how they would avoid panic. They make the statement that disclosure at the
point of sale, “firesafe” council education programs, and homeowner’s association education will increase
the level of awareness and prevent panic. Even if people actually read the disclosure and attended homeowners’ association
and firesafe council meetings (which they do not), it wouldn’t make any difference. The concept that people won’t
panic because of something they may have read or heard is ridiculous and is lacking common sense. The developers
then state that the planned roadway system for egress would serve to eliminate or greatly reduce the level of anxiety. They
never evaluate how the planned roadways would function in a fast-moving wildfire with dense smoke. Having studied the
ability for egress out of Stonegate, there is no problem concluding that the anxiety would be sky-high for people would realize
they were trapped in a wildland fire (see evacuation studies). In fact, the developers actually state:
“In the most recent catastrophic fires panic and loss of life were attributed to lack of warning and narrow roads
with poor visibility due to smoke…” Stonegate residents will lack adequate warning in the
event of a fire starting adjacent to or within the project, because such a fire is predicted to race up the mountain in 10
to 15 minutes---little or no warning---based on CalFire’s own scenarios. The smoke will be abundant, making the very
limited egress (independent on the width of the roads which were supposed to be evaluated by the fire district in any event
and were not) almost useless or even worse than staying in one’s home and praying. In essence, they are stating that
the conditions for panic and loss of life are exactly what would occur at Stonegate. The high-ranking fire personnel
of the County approved Stonegate's Fire Protection Plan containing these statements. CalFire looked the other way even
though it is responsible for evaluating a FPP in a State Responsibility Area. Stonegate’s
analysis of two wildfire scenarios are contained in its FPP. The first scenario states that a wildfire will occur east of
the project and there will be enough time to relocate. There are no facts given to quantify the time involved or even to suggest
what that time frame may be. The second scenario (called “Fire Condition One”) pertains to a wildfire starting
in or near the base of Merriam Mountain in Santa Ana wind conditions. Instead of the wildfire now racing through
the 1,200 acres of chaparral, the wildfire is predicted by Stonegate to be ”long” and “very narrow”
in shape (!) and “run out of fuel. (!)” The developers then state that if the flanks of the
fire cannot be readily contained, the fire will “spread slowly” (!) and come up against the FTZs. They then
state: “Any temporarily displaced residents could quickly relocate to pre-designated safety zones (park/commercial area)
within the project area.” Even
one of Stonegate’s own fire experts, Don Oaks, stated he would tell residents to stay in their house rather than seek
shelter outdoors in the event of a wildland fire.[4] To quote a letter from Don Oaks to Ralph Steinhoff (fire
services coordinator for the County), Mr. Oaks wrote: “PTSD (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) would be even more
of a problem if one were exposed directly to the view of the flames, the noise created by the firestorm, the impact on your
skin, the flying embers and brands striking your skin and eyes.” However, Stonegate can’t say SIP so they advise
residents to shelter in a park in the project. This is sheltering in place of a sort, in the craziest
and most dangerous way. They are again admitting the Stonegate project cannot be evacuated in time. They depend on the design
of their 2,700 attached, semi-attached, multi-story, densely packed homes on 40/x100 lots surrounded by 1,200 acres of
combustible chaparral to escape smoke, firebrands and flames and say that there would be no loss of life or structure damage.
This is not based on any scientific or experiential evidence. The final Fire Protection Plan was written by Stonegate’s
fire experts after they were boxed into a corner. The development cannot be evacuated
in a timely manner, so they make believe the fire will never reach their homes. They also make believe the firebrands
won’t hit the homes and if they do, that the fire-resistive structures won’t burn. They ignore the dangerous
effects of smoke except to say it will be a “problem.” Even though warned by the American Lung Association that
those with certain medical conditions, babies, young children, and the elderly may not survive, Stonegate gives no consideration
to those segments of the population that cannot tolerate smoke. They do not say how firebrands will affect the 2,700 homes or what will happen if some of these homes catch fire, turning
the wildfire into an urban fire with people trapped in their homes, fire spreading from house to house, and no way to get
out of the project. The fact that the County fire personnel
approved this FPP over Christmas vacation without any community or Fire Board input suggests that the FPP could not be defended
and the County knew it. The County fire personnel were pawns of Horn and were told to approve the FPP no matter what.
The risk of injury or death to the residents of the Stonegate development
will be very significant. The developer states that the risk will be less than significant.
. The President of the Fire Board was in no rush to do anything about the
FPP once it was approved by the County. One would think that if the County approved the final FPP before it was even seen
by the District, there would be some outrage. This is especially true considering an election was just held in which the fire
danger of Stonegate was a major concern to voters. The Board President said he would respond in a “slow and steady”
manner and he was going to study this and write a response when ready. However, other members of the Board wanted immediate
action. A letter of rejection of Stonegate's FPP was then drafted and unanimously supported by the Board.
It was sent to the County with return receipt requested and was officially received by the County. The rejection of
Stonegate’s Fire Protection Plan sent to the County can be found in the Appendix. The
County did not reply to the Fire District in trying to explain why the County clandestinely approved the FPP in spite of the
many reasons that the Fire Board cited for rejecting the plan. The FPP, a document that the County itself said had to be approved
by the District, was rejected by the Fire District Board for very valid reasons – mainly that the risk to future residents
would be very significant in a fast-moving fire labeled as Fire Condition One by the developer. Any mitigation
that the developer had suggested in no way reduced the very significant risk of injury or death to the residents of the project. . One would expect the Fire
Chief of a local fire district to be most concerned with the safety and welfare of the residents of that district, both present
and future. We were astonished to learn that the Deer Springs Fire District Fire Chief defined his role
differently. He described himself as the “liaison” between the County and the District. He did not
describe himself as a representative of and advocate for of the District’s residents with regard to fire
safety. One would hope for a fire chief who would speak out and tell the County they were wrong when they endangered the safety
of the district. One would want a fire chief who would tell the County that they should not pass a FPP without getting the
approval and input from the District involved, particularly a district that fights its own fires without County
assistance and is supported by revenues from residents of the district. Not this Deer Springs Chief. He acted as a yes man
to the County. When the Fire District Board (who on the organizational chart of the Fire District is unquestionably his superior)
rejected Stonegate’s Fire Protection Plan, the Fire Chief stated that the Board
only has the right to “endorse” the plan, not to approve or disapprove it. This was said in spite of the documentation
showing the District must approve the FPP. He also thought it was a good fire protection plan and that he approved of it.
He speculated that smoke shouldn’t be a problem for Shelter-in-Place residents because “smoke rises.” He
approved of people not being able to evacuate during a wildland fire and did not think it a significant risk to those people.
He approved of people going outdoors during a wildland fire in the midst of smoke, flames, and heat and sheltering in an open
space. He approved of children, infants, the elderly and the handicapped remaining behind in a wildland fire with ember storms
and dense smoke. He also said that his hands were tied since if the codes were followed, then the FPP must be approved. He
ignored Article 86 and the most important provision of the FPP that must be adhered to, again worth repeating: The
risks must be mitigated so that there is no significant risk of injury or death to the people who reside there.
The County and the Fire Chief consistently ignored this provision and they do so purposely. When asked how many times he has
fought a wildland fire where residents chose to remain in their homes, he said zero. It is obvious that an agreement to remain
silent existed between the County politicians, the DPLU fire personnel, the Planning Unit, and CalFire, a state agency. All
this is done for the sake of a developer who has heavily contributed to the re-election campaigns of the County Supervisor.
When a fire chief in San Diego County speaks out against development in any way, he is told to keep quiet by his superiors
and the County. When the issue of safety is brought up, it is quickly squelched. . In the wildfires of San Diego
in 2003 and 2007, massive evacuations were ordered and the loss of life was minimal in both fires (fewer than 20). There is
no doubt that evacuation is essential and must be the prerequisite of safety in wildfire-prone areas. Only recently, with
the Stonegate proposal for a housing development, has the community challenged the wisdom of building a dense development
with poor egress in a wildfire-prone area that cannot be evacuated in a timely fashion. We have already talked about Involuntary
Shelter-In-Place as a poor substitute for evacuation and how ISIP presents a significant risk of injury or death, in violation
of the state’s Public Resource Codes. We have not yet discussed in detail why Stonegate cannot be successfully evacuated
in a fast-moving fire that starts near the project. Intuitively, it is not hard to imagine why 10,000 to 13,000 residents
would not be able to get out in a fast-moving fire but we will now analyze this in detail. To begin with, we will reiterate that the developers have
themselves stated that the development cannot be evacuated in a scenario they called Fire Condition One. The
problem can be divided by considering the density of the project, the egress available, and the time restraints related to
the location of the project. . Density:
When the developer originally was proposing to build 2,395 units, they stated
that the population would be between 8,000 to 10,000. When they increased the number of housing units to 2,700, the population
by simple extrapolation becomes 10,000 to 13,000. There will probably be an even greater number of residents since much of
this housing will be multi-family, attached, two-story and three-story units. The residents will own and drive approximately
5,400 vehicles (by County estimates) and there will be between 10 to 12 vehicle trips per day for each unit (Circulation Department
estimates of San Diego County). Therefore, it would not be unreasonable to estimate that there would be almost thirty thousand vehicle trips per day generated by Stonegate almost exclusively entering onto and exiting
from Deer Springs Road (the only main arterial draining this development). . Egress: Stonegate has two internal roads (Meadow Lake Lane and Meadow
Parkway) that both lead to the same external road (Deer Springs Road). There are two other roads (Camino Mayor and North Tank
Road) that directly wind through the area of natural habitat. These two roads will not be able to be used for evacuation in
a worst-case wildfire scenario, since they go right through the heart of the burning wildland terrain. Deer
Springs Road: This road is presently a two-lane road that has been studied by the Circulation Department of the County and
given a Level of Service (LOS) grade of F. Levels of Service vary from Grades A [freely moving] to Grade F [stop and go traffic]).
The County’s Circulation Department has concluded that if houses are built according to the already existing General
Plan (no special developments like Stonegate) and Deer Springs Road were widened to four lanes, then it would still be a Grade
F road in 2020. The threshold capacity of this four-lane road is about 33,000 ADTs (car trips). Stonegate says that they will
widen a portion of Deer Springs Road to four lanes and thus improve the circulation around its development. According to state
law, they have to achieve a LOS of D. It is not hard to see that if you add 30,000 additional vehicle trips (the result of
building Stonegate) to Deer Spring Road (which is estimated to have 42,000 trips on 2020 without Stonegate), 72,000 trips
are the result, easily exceeding the road’s capacity of 33,400,[5] resulting in a gridlocked Deer Springs Road and certainly nothing close to a
LOS D road which was necessary and promised. During a wildland fire, Deer Springs Road would be the only exit road in Fire
Condition One, since North Tank Road and Camino Mayor would be going through the danger zone of an actively burning area of
natural habitat. . Time: The most crucial element
of danger in building a dense development in a location site such as Stonegate is that wildland fire will travel rapidly up
the mountain to the housing development. If the fire starts at the base of the mountain, there will be virtually no warning
in a worst-case wildland fire scenario. CalFire has stated that it can be as short a time as 10 to 15 minutes before the fire
will be upon the project’s residents. It would not matter if there were 10 roads out of the project in this type of
scenario since the combination of smoke and inability to react in time would not allow a successful evacuation of so many
people (all emptying onto a Grade F Road). This is why the developer admitted that the project was predicated on Shelter-in-Place
(they really mean ISIP). If the wildfire starts one hour’s distance away (by estimates of the spread of the fire), then
Stonegate will not be able to be evacuated but will be caught in late evacuation. If a firebrand started a spot fire adjacent
to the Merriam Mountain from a fire located one mile away, the Stonegate project would face the same problem of not being
able to evacuate successfully. It is estimated that 1,600 vehicles per hour can be evacuated
if they were able to go onto a road that involved no turns and then were free to speed away. This estimate would be reduced
to 800 vehicles per hour if a turn were involved. In smoke and onto a gridlocked road, the numbers of cars able to evacuate
would be drastically less. Stonegate’s 5,400 vehicles would take many hours to evacuate and one could
never be sure that some would not be caught in their cars as the wildfire passed through. This is called late evacuation and
deaths will certainly occur. One would expect that some part of
the County Planning Unit or a part of the State’s CalFire would want to study whether Stonegate can be evacuated in
certain types of scenarios and then plan how to accomplish this in an emergency. This has been avoided even though the pre-fire
planning documents include evacuation templates as part of their content. There is presently no government agency that wishes
to include safety (in terms of evacuation) as a part of a decision in ruling on land use in spite of the 2003 and 2007 wildfires
in San Diego County, in spite of the Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Wildland Fire, and in spite of the U.S. Senate
hearings on Wildland Fire. . It became obvious to the County
Supervisors that development in the WUI areas of San Diego County was threatened by the inability to evacuate and the inadequacy
of an alternate fire protection strategy such as SIP. They did not want to concede that a development of high density should
not be built in a high fire severity zone without adequate egress. They decided to promote SIP as a fire protection strategy
that could be used in a Fire Protection Plan. This would then give developers the right to build anywhere they wished since
they would no longer care have to be concerned about the ability to evacuate in the event of a wildland fire. The Supervisors
decided to clarify what a Fire Protection Plan should include and then defend the possibility of using Shelter-in-Place in
a Fire Protection Plan. First,
they clarified what a Fire Protection Plan should do (quoted from the County’s March 19, 2007 policy[6] on page 6): “The Fire Protection Plan must evaluate the adverse environmental
effects that a proposed project may have from wildland fire and properly mitigate those impacts to ensure that development
projects do not unnecessarily expose people or structures to a significant risk of loss, injury, or death involving wildland
fires.” This statement is in total agreement with what we have
been saying all along and what has been ignored by fire personnel throughout the entire fire protection bureaucracy.
The FPP is not simply a document outlining construction materials, distances, hydrants and road widths, but must, above
all, provide for and assure protection of life. They then stated what would be entailed in allowing a Shelter-in-Place strategy. On
page 21 of the same document, the Shelter-in-Place strategy is introduced. It starts by saying Shelter-in-Place is a last
resort design concept with relocation of occupants a preferred action. They state that the same practical effect as having
adequate egress must be attained (SIP must be as good as evacuation). They state that in the event secondary access
is unattainable due to topographical or geographical constraints (sounds like Stonegate), a Shelter-in-Place strategy may
be considered.(!) It then lists conditions for SIP to be considered and additionally states that additional standards, or
the modification to the standards below, may be required by the FAHJ (in Stonegate’s case the Deer Springs Fire District
Board) and the Director of Planning in order to achieve the same practical affect. There
was a huge outcry from residents throughout San Diego County criticizing the concept of Shelter-in-Place as a viable fire
strategy for a new development.[7] If there was such danger from wildfire and evacuation was not possible in a timely
fashion, then such a dense development should simply not be allowed. In response to these objections, the County took the attitude
that they will defend this new strategy by saying that “SIP is a possible design strategy and when
implemented correctly may result in the same practical effect” (as evacuation). They
go on to say that SIP is a last resort design, which begs the question: Why should a housing project be approved
if it requires a last resort design strategy with so many intangibles and potential catastrophic consequences?
The County cited the examples of Australia and the Barona Casino (both inappropriate and off-the-mark citations – see
chapter 4), and at the same time gave no attention to the notion of Involuntary SIP as discussed in Chapter 4 and the catastrophic
medical consequences to vulnerable population groups. Theirs was a very incomplete and inadequate defense of SIP and failed
to mention that SIP is purely experimental and untested. There has been no large dense development that has ever undergone
an actual wildland fire without evacuation. The fact that the County’s clandestinely approved
Stonegate’s Fire Protection Plan (as discussed in Chapter 5) while bypassing the Fire District suggests
that the County fire personnel could not be trusted in deciding whether SIP should be used. It is apparent that if a development
were targeted for approval by the Supervisors, safety deficiencies would be overlooked by the fire personnel. [1] Ordinance No. 9670 (new series) amending the County Building Code to adopt the 2001
California Building Code [2] California HSC Section 13860 as it relates to Fire
Protection Districts [3] AIAA JOURNAL, Vol. 45, No.1 January 2007, p.16-19 [4] Letter from Don Oaks to Ralph Steinhoff , Jul. 7, 2006 [5] Studies from County Circulation Dept - See Appendix [6] Guideline for Determining Significance and Report Format and content requirements –
Wildland Fire and Fire Protection [7] Hundreds of e-mails collected from all parts of San Diego County - See Appendix |